Public consultation on the review of the crisis management and deposit insurance framework

Fields marked with * are mandatory.

Introduction and general context

This consultation is also available in 23 European Union official languages.

Please use the language selector at the top of this page to choose your language for this consultation.

Please note that the questionnaire provides for additional information through hyperlinks (light blue text) and pop-up info boxes (green text).

Background of this public consultation

In response to the global financial crisis, the EU took decisive action to create a safer financial sector for the EU single market. These initiatives triggered comprehensive changes to European financial legislation and to the financial supervisory architecture. The single rulebook for all financial actors in the EU was enhanced, comprising stronger prudential requirements for banks, improved protection for depositors and rules to manage failing banks. Moreover, the first two pillars of the banking union – the single supervisory mechanism (SSM) as well as the single resolution mechanism (SRM) – were created. The third pillar of the banking union, a common deposit insurance, is still missing. The discussions of the co-legislators on the Commission’s proposal to establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), adopted on 24 November 2015, are still pending.

In this context, the EU bank crisis management and deposit insurance framework lays out the rules for handling bank failures while protecting depositors. It consists of three EU legislative texts acting together with relevant national legislation: the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD – Directive 2014/59/EU), the Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation (SRMR – Regulation (EU) 806/2014), and the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive (DGSD – Directive 2014/49/EU). Provisions complementing the crisis management framework are also present in the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR – Regulation (EU) 575/2013) and the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD – Directive 2013/36/EU). The winding up Directive (Directive 2001/24/EC) is also relevant to the framework. For the purpose of this consultation, reference will be made also to insolvency proceedings applicable under national laws. For clarity, the consultation only concerns insolvency proceedings applying to banks. Other insolvency proceedings, notably those applying to other types of companies, are not the subject of this consultation.
Experience with the application of the current crisis management and deposit insurance framework until now seems to indicate that adjustments may be warranted. In particular:

- One of the cornerstones of the current framework is the objective of shielding public money from the effects of bank failures. Nevertheless, this has only been partially achieved. This has to do with the fact that the current framework creates incentives for national authorities to deal with failing or likely to fail (FOLF) banks through solutions that do not necessarily ensure an optimal outcome in terms of consistency and minimisation in the use of public funds. These incentives are partly generated by the misalignment between the conditions for accessing the resolution fund and certain (less stringent) conditions for accessing other forms of financial support under existing EU State aid rules, as well as the availability of tools in certain national insolvency proceedings (NIP), which are in practice similar to those available in resolution. Moreover, a reported difficulty for some small and medium-sized banks to issue certain financial instruments, that are relevant for the purpose of meeting their minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL), may contribute to this misalignment of incentives.

- The procedures available in insolvency also differ widely across Member States, ranging from pure judicial procedures to administrative ones, which may entail tools and powers akin to those provided in BRRD/SRMR. These differences become relevant when solutions to manage failing banks are sought in insolvency, as they cannot ensure an overall consistent approach across Member States.

- The predictability of the current framework is impacted by various elements, such as divergence in the application of the Public Interest Assessment (PIA) by the Single Resolution Board (SRB) compared to National Resolution Authorities (NRA) outside the banking union. In addition, the existing differences among national insolvency frameworks (which have a bearing on the outcome of the PIA) and the fact that some of these national insolvency procedures are similar to those available in resolution, as well as the differences in the hierarchy of liabilities in insolvency across Member States, complicate the handling of banking crises in a cross-border context.

- Additional complexity comes from the fact that similar sources of funding may qualify as State aid or not and that this largely depends on the circumstances of the case. As a result, it may not be straightforward to predict ex ante if certain financial support is going to trigger a FOLF determination or not.

- The rules and decision-making processes for supervision and resolution, as well as the funding from the resolution fund, have been centralised in the banking union for a number of years, while deposit guarantee schemes are still national and depositors enjoy different levels and types of guarantees depending on their location. Similarly, differences in the functioning of national deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs) and their ability to handle adverse situations, as well as some practical difficulties (e.g., when a bank transfers its activities to another Member State and/or changes the affiliation to a DGS) are observed.

- Discrepancies in depositor protection across Member States in terms of scope of protection, such as specific categories of depositors, and payout processes result in inconsistencies in access to financial safety nets for EU depositors (Study financed under the European Parliament pilot project ‘creating a true banking union’ on the options and national discretions under the Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive and their treatment in the context of a European deposit insurance scheme and issued under Article 19(6) DGSD in the context of DGSD review).

The possible revision of the resolution framework as well as a possible further harmonisation of insolvency law are also foreseen in the respective review clauses of the three legislative texts. (It is relevant in this respect to notice the European Commission’s report (2019) on the application and review of Directive 2014/59/EU (BRRD) and Regulation 806/2014 (SRMR). By reviewing the framework, the Commission aims to increase its efficiency, proportionality and overall coherence to manage bank crises in the EU, as well as to enhance the level of depositor protection, including through the creation of a common depositor protection mechanism in the banking union. Crisis management and deposit insurance, including a common funding scheme for the banking union, are strongly interlinked and interdependent, and present the potential for synergies if developed jointly. Additionally, in the context of the crisis management and deposit insurance framework review, the State aid framework for banks will also be reviewed with a
view to ensuring consistency between the two frameworks, adequate burden-sharing of shareholders and creditors to protect taxpayers and preservation of financial stability.

**Structure of this consultation and responding to this consultation**

In line with the [better regulation principles](#), the Commission is launching this public consultation to gather evidence in the form of relevant stakeholders’ views and experience with the current crisis management and deposit insurance framework, as well as on its possible evolution in the forthcoming reviews. Please note that this consultation covers the reviews of the BRRD, SRMR and DGSD.

This public consultation covers 10 questions on the key directions of the review of the bank crisis management and deposit insurance framework and is available in 23 official EU languages. Given its general nature it may be more suitable for the general public.

A [targeted consultation](#) is running in parallel from 26 January to 20 April 2021. It comprises 39 questions, including the general questions and those addressing concrete technical features, and may be more suitable for market participants, authorities and academics. Questions that appear in both questionnaires are marked. Please note that replies to either questionnaire will be equally considered.

Views are welcome from all stakeholders.

You are invited to provide feedback on the questions raised in this online questionnaire. We invite you to add any documents and/or data that you would deem useful to accompany your replies at the end of this questionnaire, and only through the questionnaire.

Please explain your responses and, as far as possible, illustrate them with concrete examples and substantiate them numerically with supporting data and empirical evidence. Where appropriate, provide specific operational suggestions to questions raised. This will allow further analytical elaboration.

You are requested to [read the privacy statement](#) for information on how your personal data and contribution will be dealt with.

The consultation will be open for 12 weeks.

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**Please note:** In order to ensure a fair and transparent consultation process only responses received through our online questionnaire will be taken into account and included in the report summarising the responses. Should you have a problem completing this questionnaire or if you require particular assistance, please contact fisma-cmdi-consultation@ec.europa.eu.

More information on

- this consultation
- the consultation document
- the consultation strategy
- the acronyms used in this consultation
- the targeted consultation running in parallel
- banking union
the protection of personal data regime for this consultation

About you

- Language of my contribution
  - Bulgarian
  - Croatian
  - Czech
  - Danish
  - Dutch
  - English
  - Estonian
  - Finnish
  - French
  - German
  - Greek
  - Hungarian
  - Irish
  - Italian
  - Latvian
  - Lithuanian
  - Maltese
  - Polish
  - Portuguese
  - Romanian
  - Slovak
  - Slovenian
  - Spanish
  - Swedish

- I am giving my contribution as
  - Academic/research institution
  - Business association
  - Company/business organisation
Consumer organisation
EU citizen
Environmental organisation
Non-EU citizen
Non-governmental organisation (NGO)
Public authority
Trade union
Other

* First name
Lena

* Surname
Elmgren

* Email (this won't be published)
lena.elmgren@deutsche-boerse.com

* Organisation name
255 character(s) maximum
Clearstream - Deutsche Börse Group

* Organisation size
Micro (1 to 9 employees)
Small (10 to 49 employees)
Medium (50 to 249 employees)
Large (250 or more)

Transparency register number
255 character(s) maximum
Check if your organisation is on the transparency register. It's a voluntary database for organisations seeking to influence EU decision-making.

* Country of origin
Please add your country of origin, or that of your organisation.
Afghanistan  Djibouti  Libya  Saint Martin
Åland Islands  Dominica  Liechtenstein  Saint Pierre and Miquelon
Albania  Dominican Republic  Lithuania  Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Algeria  Ecuador  Luxembourg  Somalia
American Samoa  Egypt  Macau  San Marino
Andorra  El Salvador  Madagascar  São Tomé and Príncipe
Angola  Equatorial Guinea  Malawi  Saudi Arabia
Anguilla  Eritrea  Malaysia  Senegal
Antarctica  Estonia  Maldives  Serbia
Antigua and Barbuda  Eswatini  Mali  Seychelles
Argentina  Ethiopia  Malta  Sierra Leone
Armenia  Falkland Islands  Marshall Islands  Singapore
Aruba  Faroe Islands  Martinique  Sint Maarten
Australia  Fiji  Mauritania  Slovakia
Austria  Finland  Mauritius  Slovenia
Azerbaijan  France  Mayotte  Solomon Islands
Bahamas  French Guiana  Mexico  Somalia
Bahrain  French Polynesia  Micronesia  South Africa
Bangladesh  French Southern and Antarctic Lands  Moldova  South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands
Barbados  Gabon  Monaco  South Korea
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*Field of activity or sector (if applicable):
- Credit institution
- Payment and electronic money institution
Financial infrastructure provider
Investment firm
Deposit guarantee scheme
Non-financial company (incl. SME)
Bank association
Consumer association
Supra-national authority
Competent / resolution authorities
Finance ministry
Other national public authority.
International organisation
Retail investor
Professional investor
Consumer / user of financial services / (Private) depositor
Independent research provider
Other
Not applicable

The Commission will publish all contributions to this public consultation. You can choose whether you would prefer to have your details published or to remain anonymous when your contribution is published. For the purpose of transparency, the type of respondent (for example, ‘business association, ‘consumer association’, ‘EU citizen’) country of origin, organisation name and size, and its transparency register number, are always published. Your e-mail address will never be published. Opt in to select the privacy option that best suits you. Privacy options default based on the type of respondent selected.

*Contribution publication privacy settings*

The Commission will publish the responses to this public consultation. You can choose whether you would like your details to be made public or to remain anonymous.

- **Anonymous**
  Only organisation details are published: The type of respondent that you responded to this consultation as, the name of the organisation on whose behalf you reply as well as its transparency number, its size, its country of origin and your contribution will be published as received. Your name will not be published. Please do not include any personal data in the contribution itself if you want to remain anonymous.
Public

Organisation details and respondent details are published: The type of respondent that you responded to this consultation as, the name of the organisation on whose behalf you reply as well as its transparency number, its size, its country of origin and your contribution will be published. Your name will also be published.

☑️ I agree with the personal data protection provisions

What is the CMDI framework?

The crisis management and deposit insurance (CMDI) framework was introduced as a legislative response to the global financial crisis, to provide tools to address bank failures while preserving financial stability, protecting depositors and avoiding the risk of excessive use of public financial resources.

The CMDI was in particular designed with the aim of handling the failure of credit institutions of any size, as well as to protect depositors from any failure.

The CMDI framework also provides for a set of instruments that can be used before a bank is considered failing or likely to fail (FOLF). These allow a timely intervention to address a financial deterioration (early intervention measures) or to prevent a bank’s failure (preventive measures by the DGS).

When a bank is considered FOLF and there is a public interest in resolving it, the resolution authorities will intervene in the bank by using the specific powers granted by the BRRD in absence of a private solution. In the banking union, the resolution of systemic banks is carried out by the Single Resolution Board (SRB). In the absence of a public interest for resolution, the bank failure should be handled through orderly winding-up proceedings available at national level.

The CMDI framework provides for a wide array of tools and powers in the hands of resolution authorities as well as rules on the funding of resolution actions. These include powers to sell the bank or parts of it, to transfer critical functions to a bridge institution and to transfer non-performing assets to an asset management vehicle. Moreover, it includes the power to bail-in creditors by reducing their claims or converting them into equity, to provide the bank with loss absorption or recapitalisation resources. When it comes to funding, the overarching principle is that the bank should first cover losses with private resources (through the reduction of shareholders’ equity and the bail-in of creditors’ claims) and that external public financial support can be provided only after certain requirements are met. Also, the primary sources of external financing of resolution actions (should the bank’s private resources be insufficient) are provided by a resolution fund and the DGS, funded by the banking industry, rather than taxpayers’ money. In the context of the banking union, these rules were further integrated by providing for the SRB as the single resolution authority and building a Single Resolution Fund (SRF) composed of contributions from credit institutions and certain investment firms in the participating Member States of the banking union.

Deposits (if not excluded under Article 5 DGSD) are protected up to EUR 100 000. This applies regardless of whether the bank is put into resolution or insolvency. In insolvency, the primary function of a DGS is to pay out depositors (Article 11(1) DGSD) within 7 days of a determination of unavailability of their deposits. In line with the DGSD, DGSs may also have functions other than the pay-out of depositors. As pay-out may not always be suitable in a crisis scenario due to the risk of disrupting overall depositor confidence, some Member States allow the DGS funds to be used to prevent the failure of a bank (DGS preventive measures) or finance a transfer of assets and liabilities to a buyer.
in insolvency to preserve the access to covered depositors (DGS alternative measures). The DGSD provides a limit as regards the costs of such preventive and alternative measures. Moreover, DGSs can contribute financially to a bank’s resolution, under certain circumstances.

The functioning of the DGSs and the use of their funds cannot be seen in isolation from the broader debate on the European deposit insurance scheme (EDIS). A possible broader use of DGSs funds could represent a sort of a renationalisation of the crisis management and expose national taxpayers unless encompassed by a robust safety net (EDIS). A first phase of liquidity support could be seen as a transitional step towards a fully-fledged EDIS, in view of a steady-state banking union architecture as the final objective for completing the post-crisis regulatory landscape. In the consultation document the references to national DGSs, as concerns the banking union Member States, should be understood to also encompass EDIS, bearing in mind the design applicable in the point in time on the path towards the steady-state.

Finally, the CMDI framework also includes measures that could be used in exceptional circumstances of serious disturbance to the economy. In these circumstances, it allows external financial support for precautionary purposes (precautionary measures) to be granted.

The main policy objectives of the CMDI framework are to:

- limit potential risks for financial stability caused by the failure of a bank
- minimise recourse to public financing / taxpayers’ money
- protect depositors
- facilitate the handling of cross-border crises and
- break the bank/sovereign loop and foster the level playing field among banks from different Member States, particularly in the banking union

General objectives and review focus

Please note that questions 1 to 6 of this general public consultation correspond to questions 1 to 6 of the targeted consultation.

Question 1. In your view, has the current CMDI framework achieved the following objectives?

On a scale from 1 to 10 (1 being “achievement is very low” and 10 being “achievement is very high”), please rate each of the following objectives:

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|   | Don't know / No opinion

11
<p>| The framework achieved the objective of limiting the risk for financial stability stemming from bank failures |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| The framework achieved the objective of minimising recourse to public financing and taxpayers’ money |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| The framework achieved the objective of protecting depositors |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| The framework achieved the objective of breaking the bank /sovereign loop |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |</p>
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Question 1.1 Please explain your answers to question 1:

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

Question 1.2 Which additional objectives should the reform of the CMDI framework ensure?

Do you consider that the BRRD resolution toolbox already caters for all types of banks, depending on their resolution strategy?

In particular, are changes necessary to ensure that the measures available in the framework (including tools to manage the bank’s crisis and external sources of funding) are used in a more proportionate manner, depending on the specificities of different banks, including the banks’ different business models?

*5000 character(s) maximum*
Clearstream Holding Group (CHG) welcomes the opportunity to comment on the elements composing the review of the bank crisis management and deposit insurance (CMDI) framework launched by the European Commission (EC) and the intention to increase efficiency of regulatory requirements and resilience of the financial sector as well as to strengthen mechanisms for a common depositor protection. We would like to take this opportunity to highlight once again our view on the bank crisis management framework and in particular the Directive 2014/59/EU as amended, the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD).

CHG consists of several entities, including Clearstream Banking S.A., Luxembourg (CBL), which acts as an International Central Securities Depository (ICSD), and Clearstream Banking AG, Frankfurt (CBF), which acts as a Central Securities Depository (CSD). Both are credit institutions within the meaning of the Capital Requirements Directive 2013/36/EU (CRD V) and the Capital Requirements Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013 (CRR). In addition, CHG, including CBL and CBF, is supervised on a consolidated level as a financial holding group. Consequently, the national transposition of the BRRD applies to both CSDs as well as CHG.

Comparable to other major EU CSDs, both CBL, as ICSD, and CBF, as CSD, hold a banking license and have applied for an authorisation to provide banking-type ancillary services under Section C of the Annex to Regulation (EU) No. 909/2014 (Central Securities Depositories Regulation, CSDR) according to Article 54 CSDR.

In regard to this consultation, we would like to reiterate our view that the recovery and resolution framework derived from the BRRD, which specifically targets potential bank failure, is not fully appropriate for CSDs based on the following considerations:

i. CSDs are considered financial market infrastructures (FMI) by international standards and are subject to stringent specific EU legislations that limit the scope of CSDs’ activities. As such, CSDs are only allowed to provide banking-type ancillary services to a very limited extent, based on a full collateralisation principle, which significantly limits the risks arising from the provision of these services compared to banks.

ii. Certain requirements of the BRRD, notably the Minimum Requirements for Own Funds and Eligible Liabilities (MREL), do not fit the business model of CSDs since they are rather tailored to the business models of traditional banks. As such, they could even pose an additional risk to the regulatory framework for CSDs’ securities settlement by forcing them to undertake significant maturity transformations through the issuance of bonds to comply with MREL.

iii. The CSDR already contains requirements for effective resolution of CSDs through dedicated capital requirements for winding down/restructuring the respective CSD services (including banking-type ancillary services). Additional requirements not adapted to FMI particularities could disproportionally impair CSDs operating with a banking license compared to banks, but also compared to CSDs without a banking license.

The limited suitability of the BRRD for CSDs is also reflected in recital 12 of the BRRD, which addresses the possibility of creating separate frameworks for the recovery and resolution of Central Counterparties (CCPs) as well as CSDs.

Subjecting CSDs operating under a banking license to requirements that specifically target (traditional) banks rather than FMIs is both inappropriate and disproportionate, and therefore contrary to fundamental principles of prudential regulation as well as the overall objective of strengthening financial market infrastructures.

In order to apply the existing requirements in a proportionate manner, CSDs authorized to provide banking-type ancillary services under Article 54 of the CSDR should not be subject to the requirements of the BRRD, or at least be exempt from certain requirements, in particular MREL, even though those CSDs might...
additionally be classified as a credit institution under Article 4(1)(a) of the CRR.

Our detailed response to this question can be found in the annex to this consultation.

Question 2. Do you consider that the measures and procedures available in the current legislative framework have fulfilled the intended policy objectives and contributed effectively to the management of banks’ crises?

On a scale from 1 to 10 (1 being “have not fulfilled the intended policy objectives/have not contributed effectively to the management of banks’ crises” and 10 being “have entirely fulfilled the intended policy objectives/have contributed effectively to the management of banks’ crises”), please rate each of the following measures:

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Question 2.1 If possible, please explain your replies to question 2, and in particular elaborate on which elements of the framework could in your view be improved:
Question 3. Should the use of the tools and powers in the BRRD be exclusively made available in resolution or should similar tools and powers be also available for those banks for which it is considered that there is no public interest in resolution?

In this respect, would you see merit in extending the use of resolution, to apply it to a larger population of banks than it currently has been applied to? Or, conversely, would you see merit in introducing harmonised tools outside of resolution (i.e. integrated in national insolvency proceedings or in addition to those) and using them when the public interest test is not met? If such a tool is introduced, should it be handled centrally at the European (banking union) level or by national authorities?

Please explain and provide arguments for your view:

Question 4. Do you see merit in revising the conditions to access different sources of funding in resolution and in insolvency (i.e. resolution funds and DGS)?

- Yes
- No
- Don’t know / no opinion / not relevant
Question 4.1 Would an alignment of those conditions be justified?
- Yes
- No
- Don’t know / no opinion / not relevant

Question 4.2 Please explain and provide arguments for your views expressed in questions 4 and 4.1:

5000 character(s) maximum
including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

Question 5. Bearing in mind the underlying principle of protection of taxpayers, should the future framework maintain the measures currently available when the conditions for resolution and insolvency are not met (i.e. precautionary measures, early intervention measures and DGS preventive measures)?
- Yes
- No
- Don’t know / no opinion / not relevant

Question 5.1 Should these measures be amended?
- Yes
- No
- Don’t know / no opinion / not relevant

Question 5.2 Please elaborate on your answers to questions 5 and 5.1:

5000 character(s) maximum
including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.
Question 6. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding a potential reform of the use of DGS funds in the future framework?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Don't know / no opinion / not relevant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The DGSs should only be allowed to pay out depositors, when deposits are unavailable, or contribute to resolution (i.e. DGS preventive or alternative measures should be eliminated).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The possibility for DGSs to use their funds to prevent the failure of a bank, within pre-established safeguards (i.e. DGS preventive measures), should be preserved.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>The possibility for a DGS to finance measures other than a payout, such as a sale of the bank or part of it to a buyer, in the context of insolvency proceedings (i.e. DGS alternative measures), if it is not more costly than payout, should be preserved.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The conditions for preventive and alternative measures (particularly the least cost methodology) should be harmonised across Member States.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question 6.1 If none of the statements listed in Question 6 does reflect your views or you have additional considerations, please provide further details:

5000 character(s) maximum including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

Please note that questions 7 to 9 of this general public consultation correspond to questions 31 to 33 of the targeted consultation.

Question 7. Do you consider that there are any major issues relating to the depositor protection that would require clarification of the current rules and/or policy response?

○ Yes
No
Don’t know / no opinion / not relevant

Question 7.1 Please elaborate on your answer to question 7:

5000 character(s) maximum
including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

Question 8. Which of the following statements regarding the scope of depositor protection in the future framework would you support?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Don’t know / no opinion / not relevant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The standard protection of EUR 100 000 per depositor, per bank across the EU is sufficient.</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The identified differences in the level of protection between Member States should be reduced, while taking into account national specificities.</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deposits of public and local authorities should also be protected by the DGS.</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Client funds of e-money institutions, payment institutions and investment firms deposited in credit institutions should be protected by a DGS in all Member States to preserve clients’ confidence and contribute to the developments in innovative financial services.</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question 8.1 Please elaborate on any of the statements in question 8, including any supporting documentation (where available), or add other suggestions concerning the depositor protection in the future framework:

5000 character(s) maximum
including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.
Question 9. Which of the following statements regarding the regular information about the protection of deposits do you consider appropriate?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Don't know / no opinion / not relevant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It is useful for depositors to receive information about the conditions of the protection of their deposits every year.</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It would be even more useful to regularly inform depositors when part of or all of their deposits are not covered.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The current rules on depositor information are sufficient for depositors to make informed decisions about their deposits.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is costly to mail such information, when electronic means of communication are available.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Digital communication could improve the information available to depositors and help them understand the risks related to their deposits.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question 9.1 Please elaborate on any of the statements in question 9, including any supporting documentation (where available), or add other suggestions concerning concerning the depositor information in the future framework:

5000 character(s) maximum

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.
Please note that question 10 of this general public consultation partly corresponds to question 36 of the targeted consultation.

Question 10. Which of the following statements regarding EDIS do you support?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Don’t know / no opinion / not relevant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It is preferable to maintain the national protection of deposits, even if this means that national budgets, and taxpayers, are exposed to financial risks in case of bank failure and may create obstacles to cross-border activity.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From the depositors’ perspective, a common scheme, in addition to the national DGSs, is essential for the protection of deposits and financial stability in the euro area.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question 10.1 Please elaborate on any of the statements in question 10, including any supporting documentation (where available), or add suggestions on how to achieve the objective of financial stability in the European Union and the integrity of the Single Market:

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

Additional information
Should you wish to provide additional information (e.g. a position paper, report) or raise specific points not covered by the questionnaire, you can upload your additional document(s) below. **Please make sure you do not include any personal data in the file you upload if you want to remain anonymous.**

The maximum file size is 1 MB.
You can upload several files.
Only files of the type pdf,txt,doc,docx,odt,rtf are allowed

4e936e67-0c21-4d31-8943-763728528f3d/CMDI_Annex_CHG.pdf

**Useful links**


**Contact**

fisma-cmdi-consultation@ec.europa.eu